Money is more than memory by Bigoni, Maria et al.
 ISSN 2282-6483 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Money is more than memory 
 
 
 
Maria Bigoni 
Gabriele Camera 
Marco Casari 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°1030 
 
 
 
 
Money is more than memory∗
Maria Bigoni Gabriele Camera Marco Casari
University of Bologna Chapman University University of Bologna
& University of Basel & IZA
September 22, 2015
Abstract
Impersonal exchange is the hallmark of an advanced society and money is one key
institution that supports it. Economic theory regards money as a crude arrange-
ment for monitoring counterparts’ past conduct. If so, then a public record of past
actions—or memory—should supersede the function performed by money. This
intriguing theoretical postulate remains untested. In an experiment, we show that
the suggested functional equivalence between money and memory does not translate
into an empirical equivalence. Monetary systems perform a richer set of functions
than just revealing past behaviors, which are crucial in promoting large-scale coop-
eration.
Keywords: Cooperation, intertemporal trade, experiments, social norms.
JEL codes: C70, C90, D03, E02
∗ We thank for comments Bart Wilson, participants in the TILEC Economic Governance
Workshop (especially the discussant, Simon Ga¨chter), the Shanghai Macroeconomics Work-
shop, and seminar participants at several universities, including Bologna, Chapman, Goethe,
Heidelberg, Missouri, UCSD, the Central Bank of Sweden, the European University Insti-
tute, and the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics. G. Camera thanks V. Bourke
and M. Luetje for providing outstanding research assistance, and acknowledges partial re-
search support through the NSF grant CCF-1101627. M. Casari acknowledges financial
support through the ERC Starting Grant number 241196. M. Casari and M. Bigoni also
gratefully acknowledge the financial contribution from the Italian Ministry of Education
(grant FIRB-Futuro in Ricerca no. RBFR084L83). Correspondence address: Gabriele
Camera, Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Dr., Orange,
CA 92866; e-mail: camera@chapman.edu.
1
1 Introduction
People have an inclination for cooperation (Bowles and Gintis, 2011), but such
predisposition is weakened when the sphere of interaction expands from per-
sonal to impersonal (North, 1991) as it happens in advanced societies, where
interactions primarily take place among strangers (Binmore, 2011; McCabe et
al., 1998; Ostrom, 2010). These cooperation challenges have led to the creation
of a variety of institutions (Greif, 2006; Kimbrough et al., 2008).
Our focus is on money, an institution that is ubiquitous across regions,
cultures and historical periods, but whose nature continues to be enigmatic.
While theory and empirical evidence indicate that monetary exchange grants
efficiency gains compared to barter or gift-exchange, the mechanism behind
this result remains open to debate and little is known about whether superior
alternatives to money exist. Understanding it can generate valuable insights
into the function and (in)stability of traditional monetary systems and of the
usefulness of the alternatives presented by digital networks such as Bitcoin
(e.g., see Krugman, 2013).
Here we present a laboratory experiment designed to fill these important
gaps. Theory views money as a crude monitoring system—a type of ”public
memory”—which has no role to play when individuals can rely on shared
knowledge of past conduct. An important implication of these theories is that
money is subordinate to public monitoring systems, which, if available, would
be used to replicate or improve upon monetary trade (Kocherlakota, 1998;
Ostroy, 1973; Townsend, 1987). Our study is the first empirical test of this
broad theoretical concept and is not tied to any specific monetary model. We
find evidence that money performs a richer set of functions than just revealing
past behaviors. In a set-up where multiple equilibria coexist, we show that the
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institution of monetary trade is more powerful than reputation-based systems
in enabling coordination on more efficient outcomes.
The experiment consists of a cooperative task involving subjects who inter-
act as strangers for an indefinite number of periods. In each period, subjects
meet in pairs, where one has the option to help the other at a cost. Everyone
has repeated opportunities to help and to receive help because roles alternate
over time. Cooperation requires trusting that help given to a stranger will be
returned by a stranger later in the game.
There are four treatments, one of which serves as a control. In all treat-
ments, indefinite repetition gives rise to a social dilemma with two conflicting
elements: opportunism, due to the short-run temptation to avoid helping oth-
ers, and coordination, because any cooperation levels-from zero to one-hundred
percent-can be theoretically attained. In the Money treatment, we add fixed
balances of intrinsically worthless electronic tokens, which participants can
choose to exchange for help. In the Memory treatment, we add a record-
keeping system based on numeric balances, which rise for those who give help
and fall for those who receive it. By design, tokens and record-keeping do not
expand the theoretical efficiency frontier with respect to self-enforcing norms
alone. Money and Memory allow help to be based on balances in the pair.
In this sense, tokens and record-keeping are theoretically affine: record-keeping
can be employed to replicate a pattern of monetary trade without transfer-
ring tokens, while tokens can communicate individual past conduct without
the need to rely on record-keeping. Through this design we can uncover be-
havioral differences between monetary systems and systems for collecting and
sharing information about past conduct.
We report four main findings. First, control groups struggled to sustain
long-run cooperation, which according to theory is an equilibrium outcome.
3
Second, tokens and record-keeping each significantly boosted long-run coop-
eration, when in fact theory asserts they should not play a role. In Money
subjects traded help for intrinsically worthless tokens, which endogenously
became money. In Memory help was also conditioned on balances in the
pair, but not in a manner that superseded the function performed by tokens.
In fact, record-keeping was not employed to replicate monetary trade. This
leads to our third finding: long-run cooperation was significantly higher in
Money than in Memory. Tokens encouraged cooperation because subjects
took turns at trading them for help, without hoarding them. This alternation
did not emerge in Memory, where some subjects accumulated large numeric
balances, thus allowing free-riders to run large deficits. This suggests that
the tokens’ superior performance is tied to the presence of external “liquidity”
constraints, which facilitate the task of coordinating on credible, incentive-
compatible trade patterns. To test it, in the Money Unconstrained treat-
ment we removed liquidity constraints, so that—as in Memory—help could
always be rewarded with a symbolic object. Here, outcomes and patterns of
behavior matched those seen in Memory, with some subjects hoarding tokens
even if this was inconsistent with payoff maximization (see also Oprea, 2014).
Previous work on finite-horizon games provides evidence that the provi-
sion of information on opponents’ past actions fosters reciprocity and con-
ditional cooperation (Ga¨chter and Hermann, 2011; Milinski et al, 2001; Ule
et al, 2009). A tendency toward positive reciprocity has also been observed in
infinite horizon social dilemmas (Camera and Casari, 2009). Our experiment
provides unique evidence that the external addition of systems for collecting
and sharing information about past conduct provided weaker dynamic incen-
tives to cooperate compared to the monetary trading system that endogenously
emerged when tokens were available. In fact, although there is evidence for
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positive reciprocity in each of these conditions, punishment of free-riders was
more frequent when tokens were available, compared to when they were not
but information about past conduct was provided. This suggests that mon-
etary systems are behaviorally more effective at promoting cooperation and
efficiency compared to record-keeping systems that do not include informa-
tion designed to support the sanctioning of non-punishers (e.g., the so-called
“second-order information” in Bolton et al., 2005; Ule et al, 2009). Liquidity
constraints are crucial for this result. If the only way of having a positive
balance is to help someone who has a positive balance, then this automati-
cally implies a sanctioning of free riders (who have zero balance) and also of
those who help them (whose balance remains zero). This second sanctioning
mechanism is only built into monetary trade, because in the other treatments
a positive balance can be obtained also by helping free riders.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the design. Section 3
presents the theory, and Section 4 reports the main results. Section 5 puts
the paper in the context of the experimental literature, and Section 6 offers a
concluding discussion.
2 Experimental design
The experiment has three main treatments: Baseline, Money and Memory
(Table 1). There is an additional treatment, called Money Unconstrained,
which serves as a robustness check and will be discussed in Section 4.2. In all
treatments subjects face a cooperative task that is repeated an indefinite num-
ber of periods, where every period subjects encounter a random counterpart
and play in pairs. Interactions are anonymous, and any form of communication
is ruled out. The design in Baseline is described next.
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Treatment
Variable Baseline Money Memory Money
Unconstr.
Group size 8 8 8 8
Token supply 0 4 0 ≥ 4
Record-keeping No No Yes No
Sessions 4 4 5 2
Subjects 96 96 120 48
Supergames 20 20 25 10
Periods (avg.) 111.5 116.2 117.6 110.0
Table 1: Sessions and treatments
Notes: The last four rows report the number of observations. Sessions’ dates (dd-mm-yy):
Baseline, 6-2-12 (two), 24-1-14, 20-2-12; Money, 7-2-12 (two), 24-1-14, 16-2-12; Memory,
13-2-12 (two), 21- & 23-1-14, 27-1-14; Money Unconstrained, 12-6-14 (two). The 2012
sessions were run at Purdue University, in the VSEEL lab. The 2014 sessions were run at
Chapman University, in the ESI lab. The sessions on 20-2-12, 16-2-12, and 27-1-14 were run
with experienced subjects (=experienced sessions): subjects were informed that all session
participants had previously participated in a session with the same treatment.
2.1 Interaction in a period
Each period subjects meet in pairs and play a “helping game” (Table 2). In this
game, one subject is a producer, and the other is a consumer. The producer
has a good, which he can consume or transfer to the consumer, who values
it more. In this case, we say that the producer “helps” the consumer. The
consumer has no action to take. Hence, it is an individual decision problem.
Producer
Y Z
Consumer d− l, d g, 0
Table 2: Payoffs in the stage “game” in Baseline and Memory
Notes: In the experiment d=6, l=2, g=20.
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In Baseline the consumer has no action to take (Table 2). The producer
chooses either outcome Z (=Help) or Y (= Do not help). Payoffs to consumer
and producer are, respectively, g and 0 if the producer helps; otherwise, they
are d−l and d, with g > 2d−l > 0. In the experiment d = 6, l = 2, g = 20 and
each point is worth $0.03. Surplus in a pair is maximum when the producer
helps, which generates g − (2d − l) = 10 points. We refer to this outcome as
the (socially) efficient outcome or, alternatively, cooperation. The dominant
strategy is not to help, which we call defection. At the end of the interaction
actions and outcome in the pair are observed by both agents.
2.2 The supergame
A session is divided into five separate supergames. In a supergame, subjects
interact within a fixed group of eight subjects, for an indefinite number of
periods. A group is comprised of four producers and four consumers with
deterministically alternating roles. At the start of every period each consumer
meets a producer at random. According to this matching protocol, there is
only a 0.25 probability to be in the same pair in two consecutive periods.1
Participants can never identify their opponent. Hence, subjects interact as
strangers because opponents change at random and are anonymous.
The duration of the supergame is determined by a random continuation
rule (Roth and Murnighan, 1978). A supergame has 20 fixed periods after
which the game continues into an additional period with probability 0.75,
which we interpret as the discount factor of a risk-neutral subject. The de-
sign guarantees an interaction of finite but uncertain duration. The expected
duration of a supergame is 23 periods; from period 20, in each period the
1There are 4! ways to match four producers to four consumers; in 3! of such pairings consumer
j meets producer i. In each period one pairing is chosen with equal probability.
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supergame is expected to go on for 3 additional periods. In the experiment
a computer randomly selects an integer number between 1 and 100, using a
uniform distribution, and the supergame ends when a number greater that 75
is selected. At the end of each period all participants in the group observe
the number drawn, which informs them about the end or continuation of the
supergame, and can also serve as a public coordination device. Subjects also
observe whether or not outcomes were identical in all four pairs (a binary vari-
able, “yes” or “no;” see Instructions). This second statistic provides a form
of anonymous public monitoring, which is introduced to ensure that the min-
imum discount factor that supports full cooperation in sequential equilibrium
remains constant across treatments (see Section 4).2
Every experimental session involves twenty-four subjects, who were divided
into three groups in each supergame for a total of fifteen groups per session. Su-
pergames terminate simultaneously for all groups. Each group is constructed
so that no two subjects can interact in more than one supergame.3
2.3 Money and Memory treatments
The Money treatment adds indivisible, intrinsically worthless electronic ob-
jects called “tokens,” which neither yield nor can be redeemed for points or
dollars. In period 1 of each supergame, every consumer is endowed with one
token, hence there are four tokens per group; this supply is known and remains
fixed throughout the supergame. Tokens can be transferred from consumer to
producer, one at a time, and can be carried over to the next period but not to
2The design uses a form of public monitoring that may also simplify coordination tasks
compared to other forms, such as revealing the frequency of actions in the group. A red
flag is a signal less open to interpretation than a frequency-based signal.
3Subjects are informed about this predetermined matching protocol.
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the next supergame. Participants can hold any positive balance of tokens.4
The introduction of tokens expands the actions sets relative to Baseline
because the stage game now includes the possibility to trade using a direct
mechanism; Table 3 explains how. A consumer can either keep her tokens
(=give 0), transfer one to the producer (=give 1), transfer one conditionally on
receiving help (=1 for Z) or on not receiving it (=1 for Y ). The producer can
still help (= Z) or not (= Y ), but now can also choose to help conditionally
on receiving either one (=Z for 1) or no tokens (=Z for 0). Each pair of
choices is associated with a unique outcome, which is reported in Table 3 along
with the relevant payoffs.5 Subjects choose simultaneously and without prior
communication, hence, they cannot signal a desire to cooperate by requesting
or offering a token. In particular, nothing prevents producers from unilaterally
providing help, if they wish to do so.
Several remarks are in order. First, the possibility of conditioning the out-
come on the counterpart’s choice might facilitate coordination on cooperation.
The producer can choose to help conditional upon receiving a token, and the
consumer can choose to transfer one token conditional upon being helped.
Helping only in return for a token is a form of monetary exchange, which can
also be achieved by choosing the actions Z and give 1.
Second, to avoid biasing the results in favor of the emergence of mone-
tary exchange the design includes actions that are antithetical to monetary
4In contrast with Camera et al. (2013) and Camera and Casari (2014) here subjects deter-
ministically alternate between the roles of consumer and producer (rather than randomly),
and their token holdings are unrestricted (instead of being bounded). This simplifies the
experimental tasks relative to the earlier design, it facilitates coordination on cooperation
and it makes monetary exchange consistent with full efficiency.
5The instructions (see Appendix C) explicitly discuss the outcomes resulting from each
choice combination. After reading the instructions and before starting the experiment, all
subjects had also to correctly answer twenty-five multiple-choice questions, including ques-
tions about the association between choices and outcomes (answers were not incentivized).
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Producer
Y Z Z for 1 Z for 0
give 0 d− l, d g, 0 d− l, d g, 0
Consumer give 1 d− l, d? g, 0? g, 0? d− l, d?
1 for Z d− l, d g, 0? g, 0? d− l, d
1 for Y d− l, d? g, 0 d− l, d? d− l, d?
Table 3: The augmented stage game in Money
Notes: The notation ? indicates that the producer receives a token from the consumer. In
the experiment d=6, l=2, g=20.
exchange. By choosing Z for 0, the producer commits to execute Z only if
the consumer chooses give 0. By choosing 1 for Y , the consumer commits to
transfer a token if the producer avoids Z. Hence, tokens may take on a nega-
tive connotation as subjects could use them to tag defectors by giving tokens
to those who do not help. Given this richer action set, the addition of tokens
might increase coordination problems, relative to Baseline.
Third, subjects cannot create or borrow tokens. Hence, a consumer with-
out tokens has no action to take, as in Baseline. Such possibility of being
“liquidity constrained” is at the heart of monetary economics. It is also central
to our study because it allows us to investigate whether removing such con-
straints through record-keeping helps to improve overall efficiency. Subjects
are informed whether a token transfer is feasible in their pair; the design mini-
mizes the chance that such information might indirectly identify the opponent.
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Before making a choice, subjects can see if the opponent’s balance of tokens is
positive or zero, but not the number of tokens held. The restriction to transfer
one token at a time is not theoretically binding in monetary equilibrium.
Finally, though subjects can hold any number of tokens, a balance of one
token per consumer is all that is needed for the monetary system to function
efficiently because with deterministic alternation of roles there is no precau-
tionary motive to hold tokens (see Section 4). This explains our choice for the
tokens’ supply: with less than four tokens monetary exchange would be some-
times unfeasible; adding tokens cannot increase the cooperation frequency, and
in fact would undermine it by reducing the endogenous value of tokens.
The Memory treatment retains the Baseline stage game and adds an
information-sharing system called (public) record-keeping. The system assigns
to each subject a numeric balance (“personal index,” in the experiment), which
tallies the help given and received in the past. The initial balance is 1 for con-
sumers, 0 for producers. As in Money, balances are intrinsically worthless
and subjects only see if the opponent’s balance is positive or not. The dif-
ference with Money is that balances are automatically updated at the end
of each interaction, based only on the producer’s action. If Y is chosen, then
balances in the pair do not change. If Z is chosen, then the producer’s balance
increases by one and the consumer’s falls by one; balances can be negative. If
subjects condition their help on balances in their pair, then Memory simpli-
fies coordination tasks relative to Money because choice sets are smaller (as
in Baseline) and balance updates are automatic.
Considering all treatments, we recruited 360 subjects through announce-
ments in undergraduate classes, at Purdue University and at Chapman Univer-
sity. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
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(Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions (a copy is in Appendix C) were read aloud at
the start of the experiment and left on the subjects’ desks. A 25-question com-
prehension quiz was administered electronically after the instruction period.
No eye contact was possible among subjects. Average earnings were $28.25
per subject (min = $18.84,max = $40.94. On average, a session lasted 115
periods for a running time of about 85 minutes (min = 72 minutes, max = 108
minutes excluding instruction reading, a quiz, and payments (Table 1).
3 Theoretical considerations
Here we show that full cooperation is an equilibrium outcome in all treat-
ments. It can be supported either by adopting a social norm of cooperation
or, alternatively, by using tokens or record-keeping. The Appendix A reports
proofs and mathematical details. Consider the following strategy:
Definition 1 (Cooperative strategy). As a producer, the player cooperates
(selects Z) as long as she has not observed a defection (Y). If a defection is
observed, then the player defects forever after.
If everyone adopts this strategy, then we call it a social norm. This norm
consists of a rule of cooperation and a rule of punishment that sanctions any
uncooperative action with permanent defection by the entire group. If players
are sufficiently patient, then the punishment threat can adequately deter any
defection from ever occurring and full cooperation is a sequential equilibrium.
Proposition 1. If β ≥ β∗ := d
g − d+ l , then the strategy in Definition 1
supports full cooperation in sequential equilibrium.
The threshold value β∗ is the cost-benefit ratio of cooperating: the pro-
ducer’s cost from helping is divided by the consumer’s surplus from being
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helped. The condition β ≥ β∗ is sufficient and necessary for existence of coop-
erative equilibrium but does not guarantee that it will be realized instead of
another outcome with lower efficiency. In fact, thanks to public monitoring of
defections, multiple equilibria exists ranging from full defection to full cooper-
ation. Full defection is always an equilibrium because it consists of an infinite
repetition of the static Nash equilibrium strategy (Y ). Full cooperation is
socially efficient because it maximizes surplus in all meetings.
To prove that full cooperation is an equilibrium two conditions must be
checked. First, in equilibrium, no producer should prefer to defect. Second,
given that everyone else follows the candidate strategy in Definition 1, out
of equilibrium no producer should prefer to cooperate. The latter condition
is immediately verified: any equilibrium defection is publicly observed, hence,
everyone defects forever after and there is no longer a reason to cooperate. The
first condition requires checking that a producer cannot improve her payoff
by moving off equilibrium (unimprovability criterion). Discounting starts on
period T = 20, which is when the incentives to cooperate are the smallest.
Hence, it is sufficient to consider continuation payoffs at the start of any period
t ≥ T . Denote vs the equilibrium payoff to an individual in state s = 0, 1 (0 =
producer, 1 = consumer). It holds that v1 > v0 with
vs :=
β1−s
1− β2 × g for s = 0, 1,
given the alternation between production (earn 0) and consumption (earn g).
To show that producers do not want to move off equilibrium, suppose a
producer defects in period t ≥ T . Her payoff satisfies
vˆ0 :=
d+ β(d− l)
1− β2
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because she earns d today (instead of 0) but causes cooperation to forever
stop from t + 1 on. It follows that v0 ≥ vˆ0 for all β ≥ β∗. The design
parameters yield β∗ = 0.375, so under reasonable assumptions about subjects’
risk attitudes cooperation is an equilibrium in every treatment because in the
experiment the continuation probability from period 20 on is 0.75.
3.1 Equilibrium with tokens
Adding tokens expands action and strategy sets, and the set of outcomes.
In Money subjects can exchange tokens and see if the opponent’s balance of
tokens is positive or not. This does not eliminate any of the equilibria possible
in Baseline because players can always adopt strategies that ignore tokens,
since tokens have no intrinsic value. Yet, there are ways in which tokens can be
used to support full cooperation. Following the insights from monetary theory,
we focus on a strategy that conditions actions on the observable balances in
the pair, identified by the letters H (=positive) and L (=zero).
Definition 2 (Monetary trade strategy). In any period and after any
history: as a consumer, the player transfers one token conditional on receiving
help only if her balance is H—otherwise she has no action to take. As a
producer, the player helps conditional on receiving a token only if her balance
is L—otherwise she does not help.
If everyone adopts this strategy, then tokens are exchanged quid-pro-quo
for help, becoming a medium of exchange. The resulting outcome is called
monetary trade. In equilibrium all encounters are trade meetings in which
the consumer “buys” help by giving the only token she has to a producer
without tokens, as in a Turnpike model (Townsend, 1980). The monetary
trade strategy is cognitively simple: it is history-independent and does not
require any change in behavior as a reaction to a defection. Off-equilibrium a
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producer may have tokens or a consumer may have none, in which case tokens
are not exchanged and help is not given.
Monetary trade does not expand theoretical efficiency. Hence, according
to theory tokens are irrelevant because the theory implicitly assumes that
agents coordinate on the best available equilibrium.6 Consumption patterns in
monetary equilibrium mirror those under the social norm—so payoffs coincide
with v0 for a producer and v1 for a consumer—and is supported on the same
parameter set of the social norm.
Proposition 2. If β ≥ β∗, then monetary trade supports full cooperation as
an equilibrium.
In monetary equilibrium a producer who refuses to help is “punished” by
not receiving a token. The player will not be able to consume next period,
much as it happens under the social norm, albeit for different reasons. This
explains why the lower bound β∗ is the same as under the social norm.
To prove Proposition 2 consider payoffs at the start of any period t ≥ T ,
without loss of generality. We need to show that in a trade meeting the
consumer prefers to spend her token to receive help, and the producer prefers
to help to receive a token. The first part of the statement is always true
because the consumer earns some surplus from trading. The latter part of the
statement is true only if the producer—who sustains a cost d to help—can
spend the token fairly soon or, equivalently, is sufficiently patient.
To formalize this intuition consider one-time unilateral deviations. Off-
equilibrium payoffs are calculated adopting recursive arguments, exploiting the
fact that the monetary trade strategy is history-invariant; hence, equilibrium
deviations temporarily alter the tokens’ distribution but never trigger a switch
6In monetary theory, tokens are said to be theoretically relevant (or, essential) only if
monetary trade allows players to achieve allocations that would otherwise not be achievable
(e.g., see Kocherlakota, 1998, p. 232).
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in behavior. Monetary trade thus allows players to easily re-coordinate on
equilibrium play two periods after a unilateral deviation occurs.
Consumer i has an incentive to trade a token for help if
d− l + β(d+ βv1) < v1 = g + β(0 + βv1),
which always holds because g > d+d− l. To interpret the inequality note that
defecting in t gives payoff d− l (instead of g) to consumer i; she enters period
t+ 1 as a producer with money and reverts back to following monetary trade.
Hence, the defection changes the distribution of tokens only temporarily: two
periods after consumer i deviates the tokens’ distribution is back at equilib-
rium. In t+1 player i is a producer who refuses to help because it would costs
her d and she has already one token to spend in t+ 2. In t+ 2 the distribution
of tokens is back at equilibrium since all consumers have money (player i is
one of them) and producers have none.
Producer i has an incentive to help in exchange for a token if
d+ β(d− l + βv0) < v0 = 0 + β(g + βv0),
which holds whenever β ≥ β∗. Defecting in t generates payoff d instead of 0,
and in t + 1 the player becomes a consumer without money. Being unable to
buy help she earns d− l and enters t+ 2 as a producer without money. Hence,
in t+ 2 the tokens’ distribution is back at equilibrium.
3.2 Equilibrium with record-keeping
Adding record-keeping leaves unaltered the action sets compared to Baseline.
It enriches the strategy sets because producers can now condition actions on
observed balances, denoted L (0 or below) and H (1 or above). This elimi-
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nates none of the equilibria that are possible in Baseline because players can
always adopt strategies that ignore balances. Yet, there are ways in which bal-
ances can be employed to support full cooperation. In particular, subjects can
replicate the monetary trade strategy without the need to exchange symbolic
objects. Hence, outcomes exist in which balances convey the same information
about past actions as under monetary exchange.7
Definition 3 (Trade strategy). In any period and after any history, the
player takes an action only as a producer. If her balance is L, then she helps
only consumers with balance H. In all other circumstances, she does not help.
This strategy supports full cooperation because, as in Definition 2, help is
conditioned on balances in the pair. Producers help only to increase their bal-
ance above zero, and do so only if the consumer’s balance is H. It immediately
follows that the trade strategy supports full cooperation when β ≥ β∗, and
record-keeping is as theoretically irrelevant as tokens.
There are two important behavioral differences between using balances to
support trade in Money and in Memory. First, the record-keeping sys-
tem simplifies coordination on efficient trading because only producers make
choices and balances are automatically updated if help is given. In contrast, in
a monetary system, producer and consumer must coordinate on the exchange
of tokens in every meeting. Second, producers should not help consumers
with balance L, but the incentives to do so differ across treatments. They are
strong under monetary trade because producers cannot increase their balance
7Not all outcomes convey the same information. The statistics L and H provide information
about past actions that might differ across treatments because in Memory producers
can always increase their balance by helping any consumer. For instance, in Memory
a consumer with balance L surely did not help in the past, but this might not be so in
Money—she might have helped without receiving a token. Considering all possible ways
to sustain cooperation with record-keeping is not our objective. Our goal is to understand
whether or not tokens are employed purely as a tool to communicate past conduct—as
theory suggests—or if they play a richer function.
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by helping consumers without tokens. This is not so in Memory since helping
always increases the producer’s balance. Hence, producers with balance L may
be tempted to help someone they should in fact punish.
4 Results
We report six main results that address the following questions: if defections
are public, is full cooperation easy to sustain? When monetary trade is possi-
ble, do subjects attain different cooperation rates than when it is not? Does
a system designed to maintain and share information about past conduct su-
persede the function performed by money?
All analyses consider only the first twenty periods in each supergame and
take as unit of observation, unless otherwise noted, the average choice of each
subject in a supergame. All results rely on sessions run with inexperienced
subjects, except Result 6 that explicitly addresses the issue of experience.
Result 1. Cooperation was difficult to support in the Baseline treatment.
Support for Result 1 is provided by Figure 1 and Table 4. Average coopera-
tion (rates) in the Baseline treatment range from 59% in the first supergame
to 47% in the last supergame.8 By design, aggregate efficiency is proportional
to average cooperation. The levels achieved in Baseline are well below full
efficiency and present a declining trend as the subjects gain experience across
supergames (Figure 1). This declining trend is statistically significant at the
5% level as illustrated by the panel regression in Table 4, model 1. The depen-
dent variable is the average cooperation frequency of a subject in a supergame
and the regression controls for individual characteristics. The message is that
8The minimum and maximum cooperation rates observed in a supergame are as follows 10%
and 85% in Baseline; 23% and 95% in Money; 19% and 100% in Memory. Inexperienced
subjects only.
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subjects did not trust that strangers would return a gift of help in the future.
There is scope for institutions to promote cooperation.
Figure 1: Relative frequency of cooperation by treatment
Result 2. In the long-run, cooperation and efficiency were greater in Money
and Memory compared to Baseline.
Support for Result 2 is provided by Figure 1 and Tables 4-5. In the last
supergame, average cooperation is 72% in Money and 60% in Memory. The
differences in cooperation with Baseline are statistically significant according
to a linear regression (1% and 5% level, respectively; Table 5). Contrary to
the Baseline treatment, in Money there is a significant positive trend with
experience (Table 4, model 2). The Memory treatment exhibits a weaker
positive trend (significant at a 10% level).
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Dependent variable: Model 1 Model 2
Individual rate (Baseline) (All treatments)
of cooperation Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Supergame -0.031** 0.016 -0.031** 0.013
Money -0.266*** 0.069
Money x Supergame 0.106*** 0.018
Memory -0.102 0.063
Memory x Supergame 0.045*** 0.016
Constant 0.308** 0.127 0.438*** 0.103
Controls Yes Yes
N. of obs. (N. of subjects) 360 (72) 1200 (240)
R-squared within 0.064 0.126
R-squared between 0.259 0.212
R-squared overall 0.179 0.172
Table 4: Cooperation rate.
Notes: One observation per subject per supergame. Inexperienced sessions, all supergames.
Panel regression with random effects at the individual level and robust standard errors (S.E.)
adjusted for clustering at the session level. The estimated coefficients for Money and Memory
are significantly different at the 1% level (p- value< 0.001). The estimated coefficients for
Money x Supergame and Memory x Supergame are significantly different at the 1% level
(p- value< 0.001). The sum of the coefficients Supergame and Memory x Supergame is
significant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.099). The sum of the coefficients Supergame and
Money x Supergame is significant at the 1% level (p-value < 0.001). Controls include the
following individual characteristics: gender, major, two measures of understanding of the
instructions (response time and number of wrong answers in the quiz) and session location
(Purdue, Chapman).
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Dependent variable: Supergame 1 Supergame 5
Individual frequency
of cooperation Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Money -0.151* 0.069 0.307*** 0.078
Memory -0.059 0.065 0.132** 0.047
Constant 0.342* 0.155 0.456*** 0.069
Controls Yes Yes
N 240 240
R-squared 0.212 0.207
Table 5: Treatment Effects on Cooperation in Supergames 1 & 5.
Notes: One observation per subject. Inexperienced sessions. Robust standard errors (S.E.)
adjusted for clustering at the session level. In supergame 1 the estimated coefficients for
Money and Memory are significantly different at the 1% level (p-value: 0.002). In supergame
5 the estimated coefficients for Money and Memory are significantly different at the 5% level
(p-value: 0.014). Controls include the following individual characteristics: gender, major,
two measures of understanding of the instructions (response time and number of wrong
answers in the quiz) and session location (Purdue, Chapman).
One may be tempted to chalk up Result 2 as an artifact of subjects being
in the habit of relying on record keeping and monetary exchange in everyday
life. Yet, two observations suggest this result has a deeper connotation. First,
the design in Money and Memory neither expands the efficiency frontier—
the efficient outcome is attainable in Baseline—nor constrains subjects to
adopt a trade strategy, nor precludes cooperation through a social norm. In
fact, adding tokens and balances expands action set, strategy sets, and the
equilibrium set relative to Baseline. Hence, if anything, the enriched stage
games in Money and Memory should increase coordination difficulties, not
reduce them (Riedl at al., 2011; Weber, 2006).
Second, Money and Memory supported lower overall cooperation than
Baseline in the short-run (Table 5). This lower performance at the start of
the sessions suggests that pre-existing “monetary” habits are not the primary
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reason for the experimental results. In fact, it suggests that subjects purpose-
fully developed a monetary trade convention over the course of the session,
with the intent to coordinate on a cooperative outcome.
Result 3. In the long-run Money supported higher cooperation and efficiency
than Memory.
Support for Result 3 is provided by Figure 1 and Tables 4-5. In the last su-
pergame the average cooperation level in the Money treatment is significantly
different from the Memory treatment (Table 5).
In the experiment, tokens became a fiat money in a manner consistent
with monetary equilibrium. This finding about the endogenous emergence
of monetary systems is in line with studies in Camera and Casari (2014);
Camera et al. (2013). Tokens were by design intrinsically worthless, and—
unlike the transfer of balances in the Memory treatment—their exchange
was not forced. It is important to note that tokens could change hands in a
way opposite to monetary trade. Consumers could transfer a token only to a
producer who refused to help (Section 2), but this behavior was not observed.
Many producers offered help only in exchange for a token (63%) and consumers
offered a token only in exchange for help (82%).9 On the other hand, when
consumers had no tokens to give, producers refused help 72% of the times.
One cannot exclude that the behavior in Memory is consistent with some
equilibrium being played. Indeed, the design admits multiple equilibria, with
frequencies of cooperation ranging from 0 to 100 percent due to public mon-
itoring. What we do observe is that efficiency is lower in Memory than in
Money even if subjects could easily adopt a trade strategy in both treat-
ments. A possible explanation for Result 3 is that subjects were unable to
exploit record-keeping to replicate a monetary trade pattern.
9These data refer only to encounters in which the exchange of tokens was feasible.
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Result 4. Money supported trade but Memory did not.
Support for Result 4 comes from Figures 2-3 and Table 6. Full cooperation
in Money and Memory can be achieved through trade as defined in the previ-
ous section. This means that after any history, in either treatment a producer
with a low balance (=L) helps only a consumer with a high balance (=H). If ev-
eryone adopts this trade strategy, subject alternate deterministically between
giving help and receiving help. Therefore, subjects would alternate between
a balance of 0 as producers and 1 as consumers (Figure 2, left panel). In the
experiment, the distribution of balances approximates the 50/50 theoretical
distribution only in Money, where about 56% of subjects hold 0 tokens and
38% hold 1 token (Figure 2, center panel). This distributional pattern com-
pletely breaks down in Memory, where only 16% of subjects have a 0 balance
and 23% have a unit balance (Figure 2, right panel).
Another indicator of the adoption of the trade strategy is provided in Figure
3. The trade strategy implies that help should be given in every equilibrium
encounter. However, this is not so off-equilibrium, where help should be given
only in some encounters but not in others. The trade strategy implies that
help should be given only in trade meetings, where the producer’s balance is
L and the consumer’s is H, and should not be given in all other meetings
and, in particular, if consumers have balance L. Figure 3 shows the empirical
frequency of cooperation when help should and should not be given under the
trade strategy (solid vs. dashed line). Theoretically, the solid line should be
at 100%, and the dashed line at 0%, if everyone followed the trade strategy.
In the Money treatment (Figure 3, left panel), the aggregate cooperation
frequency is consistent with the widespread adoption of the trade strategy:
the distance between the two lines in Figure 2, solid vs. dashed, amounts
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Figure 2: Distribution of balances in Money and Memory
Notes: Based on periods 15-20 of each supergame.
to 49 percentage points in the last supergame. No such evidence emerged in
Memory treatment, where there is a minimal difference between lines, even
in the last supergame (1 percentage point, Figure 3, right panel).
The data reveal that subjects do not use record-keeping in the same manner
they use tokens. Producers do help more frequently consumers with balance H
rather than L. However, in Memory producers do not condition their help on
their own balance as they should following a trade strategy, while in Money
they do, helping more frequently if their balance is L rather than H.
Table 6 reports the marginal effects of balances in a pair on the probability
of observing cooperation in the pair, in the two treatments. If subjects adopt
the trade strategy in each treatment, then the probability of observing coop-
eration should be higher in trade meetings—where the producer’s balance is L
and the consumer’s is H—than in all other meetings. The Money treatment
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Figure 3: Trade emerges in Money but not in Memory.
is in line with this prediction: we observe that the probability of observing
help being given is significantly higher in trade meetings than in all others
(p-value < 0.001 for all comparisons). However, this is not so in Memory,
where the estimated marginal effect of being in a trade meeting is significantly
smaller than the estimated marginal effect when both producer and consumer
have balance H (p-value = 0.003). In addition, the estimated marginal effect
of being in a trade meeting is much smaller in Memory than in Money (p-
value < 0.001 in a regression with pooled data from both treatments). This is
evidence that the trade strategy is used in Money but not in Memory.
Result 4 is especially significant in light of the fact that trade in Memory
requires less coordination than trade in Money, where trade can occur only
if consumer and producer coordinate their actions in the pair. This is not so
in Memory, because only the producer takes an action, while balances are
25
Dependent variable: Money Memory
Cooperation
outcome in a pair Estimate S. E. Estimate S. E.
Supergame 0.099*** 0.016 0.138*** 0.029
Period -0.002*** 0.001 -0.005*** 0.002
Balance: Producer, Consumer
L, H 0.440*** 0.035 0.095*** 0.016
H, L -0.118** 0.055 -0.006 0.032
H, H 0.203*** 0.063 0.191*** 0.024
Controls Yes Yes
N. of obs. (N. of subjects) 3600 (72) 4800 (96)
Table 6: How balances in a meeting affect cooperation.
Notes: One observation per subject per period. Inexperienced sessions. Marginal effects
from a logit regression. Robust standard errors (S.E.) adjusted for clustering at the session
level. Controls include the following individual characteristics: gender, major, two measures
of understanding of the instructions (response time and number of wrong answers in the
quiz) and session location (Purdue, Chapman).
automatically adjusted. So, why did trade emerged in Money and not in
Memory?
Result 5. Money removed the incentives to free ride but Memory did not.
Support for Result 5 comes from Figure 4. It shows that the introduc-
tion of Money and Memory altered the distribution of earnings because it
redistributed surplus from frequent defectors to frequent cooperators.
In each supergame, we classified subjects into five categories according to
the frequency of cooperative outcomes in periods in which they were produc-
ers (horizontal axis) and computed the associated average earnings across all
periods, regardless of their role, consumer or producer (vertical axis). In Base-
line, about 39% of subjects are frequent cooperators and 28% are frequent
defectors; those who earned the most on average are the frequent defectors
(Figure 4, solid line). Introducing the record keeping technology lowered the
incentives to defect relative to cooperation. The association between income
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Figure 4: Cooperation frequency and profits
Notes: The percentages show the share of subjects in each category by treatment.
and cooperation remained U-shaped and frequent defectors still earn the most
(Figure 4, dashed line with squares). In contrast, the use of tokens as money
generates a dramatic shift in incentives: average individual earnings and coop-
eration frequency exhibit a positive, monotone association (Figure 4, dashed
line with diamonds). Frequent defectors are now the category that earned
the least, and account for only 8% of the subject population.10 In short, a
monetary system endogenously emerged in the Money treatment and the use
of money removed the incentives to free ride. In contrast, in the Memory
treatment subjects failed to remove incentives to free-ride, which is a likely
reason why efficiency is lower in Memory than in Money.
10This result confirms previous findings reported in (Camera and Casari, 2014)
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4.1 The effect of experience
Experience with the task is relevant for cooperation, as Figure 1 suggests. The
open question is, therefore, whether Memory could outperform Money in
cooperation frequency when subjects have gained enough experience. All of
the results above are based on the behavior of subjects that had no previous
experience with the game. Result 6 below, instead, presents evidence from
subjects who had previously participated in a session of the same treatment.
Result 6. The behavior of experienced subjects confirms and reinforces Results
1-5.
Support for Result 6 is in Appendix B and is based on sessions where sub-
jects had previously participated in an experiment under the same treatment.
By the last supergame of the experienced sessions, cooperation in Baseline
had fallen to 28.8%, in Money had risen to 94.6%, and in Memory had
reached 55.4%. These levels are significantly different one from another ac-
cording to a probit regression (see Appendix B). These additional data confirm
and reinforce Results 1, 2 and 3.
Experience with the task helps to firmly establish the use of trade strategy
in Money but not in Memory, which strengthens the finding for inexperi-
enced subjects (Result 4). Consider the distance between the solid and dashed
lines in a graph made with data from experienced sessions and similar to Fig-
ure 3. By the last supergame, there was a distance of 85 percentage points in
Money and of 8 points in Memory (see Appendix B). Experience also wiped
out free riding behavior in Money in line with Result 5 for inexperienced sub-
jects. About 89% of subjects were frequent cooperators and there was nobody
with an average cooperation rate less than 40%.
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4.2 A robustness check
Subjects had the possibility to adopt identical strategies in Money and in
Memory, but they did not. In Money cooperation was based on mone-
tary trade, which is self-enforcing by design. A producer has an incentive to
help for a token—to avoid being “liquidity constrained” in the future—and
has nothing to gain from helping free-riders, who have nothing to offer in ex-
change. This contrasts with the record-keeping system in Memory because
opportunistic consumers can always “pay” by accumulating negative balances.
Here, cooperation is self-enforcing if no producer helps opportunistic individ-
uals, yet there is a temptation to do so because the producer “gets paid” after
all. A failure to punish is the source of a negative externality, which magnifies
free riders’ opportunistic motivations and displaces cooperation. In Memory,
subjects failed to fully appreciate this externality and often failed to punish.
In contrast, token exchange in Money internalized this externality, precisely
because they were liquidity constrained.
To provide additional evidence in favor of this interpretation, we ran the
treatment Money Unconstrained, which modifies the Money treatment
by removing all liquidity constraints. A consumer who wanted to trade but
was without a token, could freely produce one token for the producer; hence,
trade was always feasible and balances could be negative—as in Memory.
Result 7. Money Unconstrained supported lower cooperation and effi-
ciency than Memory.
Figure B.5 and Table B.5 (in Appendix B) provide evidence for Result 7.
The data reveal that subjects did not adopt the trade strategy in the Money
Unconstrained treatment. While we do find a tendency to help more fre-
quently consumers who have tokens, we also find evidence that producers did
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not condition help on their own balance—in contrast with what we would
expect if they had adopted the trade strategy. This behavior is in line with
what was observed in Memory (see Table B.6 in Appendix B), but is in sharp
contrasts with behavior observed in the Money treatment, where producers
without tokens helped more frequently, instead (Table 6).
5 Related studies
Our work is related to experimental studies of cooperation in repeated social
dilemmas and, in particular, to indefinitely repeated dilemmas—which support
a richer set of equilibria compared to games that are one-shot or with a com-
monly known number of periods (Dal Bo´, 2005; Palfrey, 1994). These related
studies differ in the type of stage game, matching protocol, and informational
conditions that are considered.
Most of the experiments on indefinitely repeated games have focused on
tasks in which all subjects make a decision in every period, e.g., prisoners’
dilemmas, voluntary contribution mechanisms, Bertrand duopolies, or trust
games (see Bigoni et al., 2012; Engle-Warnick and Slonim, 2006; Kurzban and
Houser, 2005; Roth and Murnighan, 1978). In contrast, the stage game in our
design is a cooperative task known as helping or gift-giving game, in which
one subject makes a decision and the other is passive (Nowak and Sigmund,
1998). The game is at the core of a large class of decentralized trade models in
macroeconomics (Kocherlakota, 1998). The task is simple and directs subjects’
attention to the possibility of an intertemporal exchange of favors, which is at
the core of the present study.
The typical matching protocol in indefinitely repeated experiments involves
fixed pairs (e.g., Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette, 2011), which is suitable to study co-
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operation in small societies, where interaction is characterized by repeated
encounters with known individuals. Instead, we adopt a strangers’ matching
protocol, which prevents subjects from relying on reciprocity. Such protocol
allows us to study institutions that promote large-scale cooperation, which is
central to understanding outcomes in contemporary societies where there is
less scope for reciprocity because social interactions are fragmented. There is
a related literature on this theme, which has mostly focused on personal pun-
ishment and information-sharing institutions such as communication (Camera
and Casari, 2009; Cooper and Kuhn, 2014). Our unique contribution is to
concentrate on the institution of money.
Our paper studies how knowledge of others’ past actions affects trust and
cooperation in a helping game. A correspondence exists with the literature
on scoring systems, which mostly adopts helping games, albeit with a known
ending.11 The information-sharing system generally adopted in this literature
differs from the one in the Memory treatment along several dimensions. First,
individuals can observe a summary of only the most recent decisions of their
opponents (e.g., Ule et al, 2009); we instead give a summary of all past deci-
sions of opponents. Second, scores typically account only for the help given,
ignoring the help received—unlike our experiment. Third, our design differs
from experiments on “second order” information (e.g., Bolton et al., 2005;
Milinski et al, 2001) as the information summaries provided in our experiment
are not designed to reveal possible motives behind an individual’s refusal to
help (e.g., to discover if it is a reaction to defections by someone else).
11There is also a literature that has adopted indefinite horizon games of a different type,
mostly prisoners’ dilemmas or trust games to study the connection between knowledge of
opponents’ histories and cooperation (e.g., Bohnet and Huck, 2004; Camera and Casari,
2009). A hybrid design is in Offerman et al (2001), where subjects plays a one-shot,
one-side giving problem, in a sequence of unknown length.
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By studying indefinitely repeated games where subjects may exchange sym-
bolic objects we contribute to an experimental literature about the endogenous
emergence of fiat monetary systems (Camera and Casari, 2014; Camera et al.,
2013). We have built upon these earlier studies, introducing two main changes
to the design. First, role alternation is deterministic, which implies that the
trade strategy supports full efficiency. Second, we added the Memory treat-
ment, to offer a direct test of the theoretical assertion that the fundamental
role of money in a society is to reveal past behaviors. Such a test represents
a unique contribution to monetary economics and also to the experimental
literature on fiat money (e.g., Deck et al, 2006; McCabe, 1989).12
Camera et al. (2013) offer an evolutionary model based on replicator dy-
namics of three types of players: defectors, who never help, cooperators, who
always help, and traders, who exchange help for a token. Without tokens,
only defectors would survive; in contrast, cooperation can emerge with tokens
because monetary exchange gives an evolutionary advantage to traders. This
advantage is lost with Memory and Money Unconstrained because here
defectors can increase their fitness at the expense of all other players because
they are as likely as anyone else to receive help from cooperators, but also
from traders, by simply accumulating increasingly negative balances.
6 Conclusion
At the heart of economics lies the notion that specialization and trade hold
the key to economic development. Yet, broadening the scope of commerce
from a personal to an impersonal domain presents hurdles because reputation,
trust and other motivational mechanisms can no longer be leveraged to deter
12A broader review of the experimental literature on money is in Camera and Casari (2014).
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opportunistic behaviors. Many institutions have emerged over the course of
history to assist impersonal exchange (Greif, 2006; North, 1991; Ostrom, 2010),
including money, which remains “the universal instrument of commerce” today
much as it was more than two centuries ago when Adam Smith wrote those
words (Smith, 1776, Chapter 4).
Through an experiment, we have analyzed the behavioral role of money in
comparison to an institution for maintaining and sharing information about
past conduct, which monetary economists call “memory.” Theory asserts that
money has no role to play when individuals can rely on shared knowledge of
past conduct to reproduce patterns of monetary exchange. We constructed
economies in which strangers—who by design cannot engage in relational
contracting—can derive significant benefits from cooperating over the long
haul. We find that the suggested theoretical affinity between money and mem-
ory does not empirically translate into a functional equality. The differences
in long-run efficiency, strategies and distribution of earnings in the Money
and Memory treatments demonstrate that money performs a richer set of
functions than just revealing past behaviors.
Cooperation was significantly greater in Money compared to Memory,
a difference that becomes increasingly evident as subjects gain experience. In
both treatments producers conditioned their choice to help others on balances
in their pair, but did so in a dissimilar manner. In Memory, many helped even
when their own balance was already positive, which set the wrong incentives
for free riders—who continued to behave opportunistically. On the contrary,
this pattern is rare in Money, and this was instrumental to its success.
Fundamentally, this occurs because groups of strangers are unable to co-
ordinate on collective punishment schemes. This is already evident in the
Baseline treatment (Result 1) where subjects observe whether there are
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free-riders in the group without being able to identify them. Cooperation
can be self-enforcing only if the group adopts a common punishment scheme,
but groups seem unable (or unwilling) to do so, possibly due to heterogeneity
in beliefs, cognitive skills, or emotional reactions. The addition of record-
keeping in Memory lessens this fundamental behavioral problem (Result 2)
by providing individual-specific information on past conduct, but does not
fully solve it. Subjects can identify individuals as being free-riders—based on
their balances—but still do not consistently sanction them (Result 5). The
exchange of tokens in Money bypasses this coordination issue because pun-
ishment is built into the system (Result 4).
In the Money treatment, monetary trade is self-enforcing because of the
presence of liquidity constraints. A producer has an incentive to help for
a token—to avoid running out of tokens in the future—and has nothing to
gain from helping free-riders, who have nothing to offer in exchange. On the
other hand, in Memory and Money Unconstrained opportunistic con-
sumers can always “pay” by accumulating negative balances. Cooperation
would be self-enforcing if no one helped opportunistic individuals, but the in-
centive to do so is too weak because producers who help “get paid” in any
case. It is precisely this lack of punishment that generates a negative ex-
ternality, which magnifies free riders’ opportunistic motivations and displaces
cooperation. As a result—although liquidity constraints are generally consid-
ered a source of inefficiency—relaxing them in the experiment (as we do in
Memory and Money Unconstrained) lowers long-run efficiency (Results
3 and 7). In our laboratory economies liquidity constraints impose discipline
on sanctioning behavior, which channels the group toward cooperation.
The findings suggest that in order to bypass the hurdle of coordinating on a
sanctioning rule, one must introduce institutions in addition to record-keeping.
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For example, consider a system that updates balances only if the producer
helps when she should, i.e., when meeting a consumer with a positive balance.
Such ad-hoc manipulation of action histories would amount to imposing a
form of monetary trade. In contrast, in the Money treatment the institution
of monetary trade emerges endogenously, it is neither imposed nor based on
ad-hoc manipulation of histories.
Could more extensive public records bring cooperation in Memory closer
to the levels observed in Money? A broader information disclosure, such as
making public all identities and all past actions, is known to have a power-
ful behavioral effect on cooperation because it enables relational contracting
(e.g., Camera and Casari, 2009). But such disclosure would fundamentally
change the nature of this study, which is to take on the bigger challenge of
investigating how to sustain cooperation among strangers, when relational
contracts are unavailable. The design supplies public information at a level
that equally supports full cooperation in all treatments—without the need
of additional institutions—while carefully ensuring that interactions remain
impersonal. Subjects are informed whether someone defected in their group,
without being able to single the offender out. Record-keeping augments this
anonymous public monitoring system with a summary of the opponent’s past
history in the form of a concise balance (L or H); according to theory, this
is sufficient to facilitate cooperation by replicating a monetary trade pat-
tern, while maintaining interaction impersonal. An alternative design with
precise numeric balances has the drawback of allowing identification of past
opponents—altering the nature of the interaction from impersonal to personal.
The experimental evidence we provide reinforces the long-held view that
monetary systems are key to support impersonal exchange, intertemporal trade
and, consequently, large-scale cooperation. It also highlights original aspects
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of the institution of money that were previously ignored or little understood.
The analysis demonstrates that the use of money imposes a discipline on what
individuals are willing to do in order to keep the economy on a cooperative
track. Such findings suggest that well-functioning monetary systems are not
simply rudimentary arrangements for monitoring past conduct in society, but
play a richer role than previously thought.
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Appendix A (not for publication)
Details and Proofs of Propositions
1 The model
A group is composed of N = 2n identical players. On the initial period t = 1,
the population is randomly divided into n ≥ 2 consumers (=“blue,” in the
experiment) and n producers (“red”); each player has equal probability of
being assigned either role. In all subsequent periods players deterministically
alternate between these two roles; producers in period t become consumers in
t+ 1, and vice-versa.
Matching in a period: An exogenous matching process randomly partitions
the population into n consumer-producer pairs in each period t. Pairings are
random, equally likely, and independent over time. Given that there is an
equal number n of consumers and producers, there are n! ways to create n
consumer-producer pairs. Let oi(t) be player i’s opponent in period t. Fixing
some player j 6= i, it holds that oi = j in (n− 1)! of all possible pairs. Hence,
in each period any given consumer is matched to any of the n producers with
probability 1/n (and vice-versa).
Interaction in a pair: In Baseline, only the producer has a choice to make,
either Z or Y . If Z is the outcome, then g is the payoff to the consumer and 0
is the payoff to the producer. If Y is the outcome, then d is the payoff to the
consumer, while the producer obtains d − l with −l ≤ 0 ≤ d < g; see Figure
1. The outcome Z is called cooperation because it generates g − 2d + l > 0
surplus, where g − (d − l) is the consumer’s share and −d is the producer’s
share. The outcome Y is called defection, as it generates no surplus. The
interpretation is that there are gains from specialization and trade: producers
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have a specialized perishable good, which gives more consumption utility to
consumers than producers. Define the (socially) efficient outcome in a match
as the one in which total surplus is maximized. Cooperation is efficient but is
not mutually beneficial. Defection is the unique Nash equilibrium of a one-shot
interaction.
The supergame: consider an infinite repetition of the interaction, indexing
time t = 1, 2, . . .. Period payoffs are geometrically discounted at rate β =
0.75 starting from period T = 20. Histories are private information, but
at the end of each period, players can observe the actions of their opponent
and if outcome are identical in all meetings. We call this anonymous public
monitoring because it allows public detection of defections on the equilibrium
path but it does not allow players to identify opponents. These assumptions
imply that players can neither build a reputation nor engage in relational
contracting. Payoffs in the repeated game are the sum of expected period-
payoffs, discounted starting on period T . In the repeated game, the efficient
outcome corresponds to cooperation in each meeting of every period.
Matching across supergames: In each experimental session we created five
supergames ensuring that no two subjects could be paired in more than one
supergame. Groups are created as follows. In each supergame there are three
groups with eight subjects each. Four are of type 1 (beginning producer) and
four of type 2 (beginning consumer). Type 1 subjects can only meet type 2
subjects and viceversa. The 24 subjects are partitioned in 6 sets of 4 each:
A = {1, 2, 3, 4}, B = {5, 6, 7, 8} , . . . , F = {21, 22, 23, 24}. The sets A through
F are fixed for the duration of the session and are paired in each supergame to
form groups. During the session subjects are matched to subjects from other
sets. The groups can be read in the table below.
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Pair this set...
A B C D E F
. . . to this set in supergame 1 C E A F B D
. . . to this set in supergame 2 B A F E D C
. . . to this set in supergame 3 D C B A F E
. . . to this set in supergame 4 E F D C A B
. . . to this set in supergame 5 F D E B C A
That is in supergame 1, group 1 is composed of sets {A,C}, group 2 of sets
{B,E} and group 3 of sets {D,F}, and so on.
2 Existence of a cooperative equilibrium
To support full cooperation as an equilibrium outcome we consider a grim
trigger strategy described by a two-state automaton.
Definition 1 (Cooperative strategy). At the start of any period t, player
i can be “active” or “idle,” and takes actions only as a producer. As an active
producer, player i selects Z, and as an idle producer selects Y . The player
starts active on the initial date t = 1; in all t ≥ 1
(i) if player i is active, then i becomes idle in t+1 only if some producer in the
group—not necessarily the producer in {i, oi(t)}—chooses Y . Otherwise,
player i remains active;
(ii) There is no exit from the idle condition.
We call (full) cooperation the outcome that results when everyone adopts the
strategy in Definition 1. If everyone adopts this strategy, then this strategy is
called a social norm. Intuitively, this norm consists of a rule of cooperation
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and rule for punishment: (i) Cooperation: if the player is a producer, then he
selects Z; (ii) Punishment: if an outcome Y is observed in the group, then
the player will always select Y whenever he is a producer. The central feature
of this norm is that the entire group participates in enforcing defections but
in equilibrium no one ever defects. In what follows we show that, under this
social norm, cooperation is a sequential equilibrium if β is sufficiently large.
Proposition 3. if β ≥ β∗ := d
g − d+ l , then the strategy in Definition 1
supports full cooperation in sequential equilibrium.
The proof is contained in the remainder of this section. Start by calculating
equilibrium payoffs. Recall that players deterministically alternate between
the two roles of producer and consumer. Hence, in equilibrium players earn g
every other period. Discounting kicks in on date T , hence, only payoffs from
periods t = T + 1 (included) are discounted at rate β. Let vs(t) denote the
equilibrium payoff at the start of t = 1, 2, . . . to an player who is in state
s = 0, 1, where 0 =producer and 1 =consumer.
Lemma 1. Fix T ≥ 1 and β ∈ (0, 1). In cooperative equilibrium we have
v1(t) > v0(t) for all t = 1, 2, . . ., where
vs(t) :=

g × T − t2 + vs, if T − t = 2k
g × T − t+ 12 + βvs, if T − t = 2k − 1,
vs, if T − t ≤ 0,
(1)
and
vs :=
β1−s
1− β2 × g for s = 0, 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. To prove the result we consider the two cases t ≥ T
and t < T separately.
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Let vs denote the equilibrium payoff at the start of period t ≥ T to an
player who is in state s = 0, 1 (0 identifies a producer). It holds that
vs :=
β1−s
1− β2 × g for s = 0, 1.
The payoff is time invariant because of the stationary alternation between
states.
Now consider period t < T . According to the proposed strategy those who
are initial consumers earn g on odd dates (t = 1, 3, . . .) and zero otherwise,
while initial producers earn g on even dates (t = 2, 4, . . .) and zero otherwise.
Hence, knowing whether T − t is odd or even matters. For j, k = 1, 2 . . . and
s = 0, 1 it holds that
vs(t) =

g × T − t2 + vs if T − t = 2k
g × T − t+ 12 + βvs if T − t = 2k − 1.
The continuation payoff vs(t) has two components. The first sums up the
period payoffs for all t ≤ T − 1. The second sums up the period payoffs for
all t ≥ T . It should be clear that vs(t) is increasing in T for s = 0, 1 and it
achieves a minimum when T − t = 1.
Consequently, the equilibrium payoff to an player in state s = 0, 1 on any
date t ≥ 1 is given by (1). We have v1(t) > v0(t) for all t because v1 > v0 for
all β ∈ (0, 1).
The equilibrium payoff is found simply by substituting t = 1 in (1).
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2.1 Incentives in and off equilibrium
To determine the optimality of the cooperative strategy we must check two
items: (i) In equilibrium no producer has an incentive to defect; (ii) out of
equilibrium no producer has an incentive to cooperate. We let vˆs(t) denote
the continuation payoff to an player in state s on date t, off equilibrium.
In equilibrium no producer defects: Conjecture that the strategy in Def-
inition 1 is a social norm. Consider a generic producer in a period t ≥ 1;
choosing Z is a best response if
v0(t) ≥ vˆ0(t). (2)
The left-hand-side of the inequality denotes the payoff to a producer who
cooperates in the period, choosing Z. The right-hand-side denotes the contin-
uation payoff on date t if the producer defects in equilibrium (reverting back
to playing the social norm in the following period), given that off-equilibrium
everyone follows the group punishment rule prescribed by the social norm.
Hence, if a defection occurs on t, then every producer selects Y from t + 1
because equilibrium defections are public.
It should be clear that
vˆ0(t) = vˆ0 :=
d+ β(d− l)
1− β2 if t ≥ T.
For k = 1, 2, . . ., the continuation payoff off-equilibrium satisfies
vˆ0(t) :=

(d+ d− l)× T − t2 + vˆ0 if T − t = 2k
(d+ d− l)× T − t+ 12 + βvˆ0 if T − t = 2k − 1,
vˆ0 if T − t ≤ 0.
(3)
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Off equilibrium payoffs are independent of the size of the group N since pro-
ducers defect forever after seeing a defection.
Lemma 2. Fix T ≥ 1 and β ∈ (0, 1). If
β ≥ β∗ := d
g − d+ l ,
then v0(t) ≥ vˆ0(t) for all t = 1, 2, . . ..
Proof of Lemma 2. The result is obtained by manipulation of the equations
in (3). Note that
v0 − vˆ0 = β1− β2 × g −
d+ β(d− l)
1− β2 =
β
1− β2 × (g − 2d+ l)−
d
1 + β
Now define
∆0(t) = v0(t)− vˆ0(t)
=

(g − 2d+ l)× T − t2 + v0 − vˆ0 if T − t = 2k
(g − 2d+ l)× T − t+ 12 + β(v0 − vˆ0) if T − t = 2k − 1,
v0 − vˆ0 if T − t ≤ 0.
It is immediate that ∆0(t = T−2k) > ∆0(t ≥ T ); simply note that g−2d+l >
0 by assumption. Also, ∆0(t = T − 2k + 1) > ∆0(t ≥ T ); to prove it insert
k = 1 (the most stringent case), rearrange the inequality, and then insert the
expression for v0 − vˆ0, to obtain the inequality g − 2d+ l > −d.
Given that the minimum value of ∆0(t) is achieved for T − t ≤ 0, then (2)
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holds for all t whenever
0 ≤ v0 − vˆ0 = β1− β2 × (g − 2d+ l)−
d
1 + β
⇔ β ≥ β∗ := d
g − d+ l .
Note that β∗ < 1 because g − 2d+ l > 0 by assumption.13
Out of equilibrium no producer cooperates: given that everyone else
follows the candidate strategy in Definition 1, it is always individually op-
timal to punish out of equilibrium. A producer optimally selects Y out of
equilibrium, since Y is the dominant action when everyone forever defects. If
a producer selects Z instead of Y out of equilibrium—and reverts to play Y
afterward—he earns 0 and the continuation payoff is βvˆ1(t), because he starts
next period as a producer, off-equilibrium. By selecting Y this period, as re-
quired by the social norm, he earns d > 0 and the continuation payoff is βvˆ1(t).
Note that vˆs(1) is the payoff associated to infinite repetition of the static
Nash equilibrium (every producer always chooses Y ), which is always an equi-
librium of the repeated game. The condition β ≥ β∗ is therefore necessary
and sufficient for existence of a cooperative equilibrium because it ensures
that players earn payoffs above those guaranteed by defecting at any point
in time. The condition β ≥ β∗ does not guarantee that cooperation will be
realized because many equilibria exist in the game. Given the experimental
parameters, we have β∗ = 3/8 = 0.375. It follows that the fully cooper-
13The producer’s payoff from cooperating is normalized to zero. For generality, let it be
c < d, instead. In this case it is easy to demonstrate that we have β∗ := d− c
g − d+ l because
v0 =
c+ βg
1− β2 .
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ative equilibrium exists in the Baseline condition because in the experiment
β = 0.75. Furthermore this equilibrium exists in all treatments because tokens
and balances are intrinsically worthless, do not restrict the action set, and can
always be ignored.
3 Existence of monetary equilibrium
Consider the Money treatment. Each of the N/2 initial consumers is initially
endowed with one indivisible, intrinsically worthless token. The supply of
tokens is fixed at M = N/2. It is assumed that token holdings are partially
observable by the opponent: in each pair, each player can verify whether the
opponent has either 0 or at least one token; the exact number is unobservable.
Consider the following strategy.
Definition 2 (Monetary trade strategy). In any period t, after any his-
tory, if the player is
• without tokens: she has no action to take as a producer; chooses Z con-
ditional on receiving a token, as a consumer;
• with tokens: as a consumer she transfers one token to the producer con-
ditional on Z being the outcome; as a producer she selects Y .
We call monetary trade the outcome that results when everyone adopts the
strategy in Definition 2. Under monetary trade help is given quid-pro-quo in
exchange for a token. Otherwise, help is not given and each player exits the
match with their initial endowment. Monetary trade is an equilibrium that
sustains the socially efficient allocation on the same parameter set as the use
of the social norm. The reason is that in monetary equilibrium all meetings
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lead to a trade due to the deterministic alternation between consumption and
production opportunities. This is demonstrated in what follows.
Proposition 4. If β ≥ β∗, then the monetary trade strategy in Definition 2
supports full cooperation in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2. Conjecture that monetary trade is an equilibrium.
Consider an player with token balance s = 0, 1 at the start of a period. In
equilibrium, a consumer has a token and a producer has none. Hence, the
probability that a consumer with a token meets a producer without tokens is 1.
Denote by vs(t) the equilibrium continuation payoff. Because the consumption
pattern is the same as under the social norm, in monetary equilibrium it holds
that vs(t) corresponds to the functions defined in (1).
Now consider deviations. We start by proving that a consumer does not
deviate in equilibrium, refusing quid-pro-quo exchange for Z. In period t ≥ 1
let βt = 1 if t < T and βt = β otherwise. Denote by v˜1(t) the payoff in t
to a consumer who defects by refusing to spend money in t. Using recursive
arguments we have
v˜1(t) = d− l + βt[d+ βt+1v1(t+ 2)]
< g + βt[0 + βt+1v1(t+ 2)] = v1(t).
The inequality holds for any βt because g > d + d − l by assumption. To
understand the inequality consider the first line. Defecting in t generates
payoff d− l instead of g, and in t+1 the player will be a producer with money,
reverting back to playing the monetary strategy (unimprovability criterion).
Hence, she will refuse to sell for another token because she already has one;
this is optimal because (i) acquiring an additional token costs her d and (ii)
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she has already one token to spend. hence, in t + 2 the player becomes a
consumer with money and the distribution of tokens is back at equilibrium.
In summary, following a unilateral deviation in t by a consumer, the group is
back on the equilibrium path in period t+ 2.
Now we prove that if β ≥ β∗, then a producer in equilibrium would not
want to deviate in any t, refusing to help for a token. Denote by v˜0(t) the
payoff in t to a producer who defects by refusing to accept money in t. Using
recursive arguments, we have
v˜0(t) = d+ βt[d− l + βt+1v0(t+ 2)]
< 0 + βt[g + βt+1v0(t+ 2)] = v0(t).
The inequality holds for any βt ≥ β∗ because g > d + d − l (if βt = 1) and
if βt = β then we simply need β ≥ β∗. The first line of the inequality shows
that defecting in t generates payoff d instead of 0. In t + 1 the player is a
consumer without money; she is unable to buy help—since everyone follows
the monetary strategy—and earns d − l. In t + 2 she is a producer without
money and the distribution of tokens is back at equilibrium. Hence, after a
unilateral deviation in t by a producer, the group is back in equilibrium in
period t+ 2.
4 Equilibrium with record-keeping
Consider the Memory treatment. Each player is initially assigned a balance,
“1” if consumer and “0” if producer, which is automatically updated at the
end of each period. The player’s balance may increase or decrease by one unit,
or may remain the same, depending on the outcome in the pair. Balances in
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a pair are unchanged if Y is the outcome. Otherwise, if Z is selected, then
the producer’s balance increases by 1 and the consumer’s balance decreases
by 1. Consequently, the sum of all balances is fixed at N/2 in each period
and over the course of the game the individual balance may take negative or
positive integer values. It is assumed that player sees whether the opponent’s
balance is L (=“0 or below”) or H (=“1 or above”). The exact balance is
private information. Balances allow players to replicate the monetary trade
without the need to exchange objects.
Definition 3 (Trade strategy). At the start of any period t and after any
history, if player i is a consumer, then he has no action to take. If player i
is a producer with balance L, then she chooses Z only if the consumer has a
balance H; she selects Y in all other circumstances.
It is therefore immediate that if β ≥ β∗ then the strategy in Definition 3
supports the fully cooperative equilibrium. The same analysis done for the
monetary trade strategy can be used here. As in the case of monetary trade, if
a producer deviates from equilibrium, then the group recovers the equilibrium
distribution of balances in two round of play, as seen before.14
14To see this, suppose player j on period t is a producer who deviates, in equilibrium. As a
consequence, his balance remains zero. Next period, player j is a consumer with 0 balance
and has no action to take. The producer who meets j on date t+ 1 does not cooperate, so
j enters next period still with 0 balance, as a producer. On t+ 2 player j, having reverted
to playing the equilibrium strategy, cooperates. We are thus back on the equilibrium path.
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Appendix B (not for publication)
Design and Results: Additional Information
1 Design specifics in Money and Memory
We call Token an electronic object that is intrinsically worthless because hold-
ing it yields no extra points or dollars, and it cannot be redeemed for points
or dollars at the end of any supergame. Tokens can be carried over to the
next period but not to the next supergame. Tokens can be transferred from
consumer to producer, one at a time. There is no upper bound on token bal-
ances and there is a lower bound of zero. Because outcome and actions are
observed only at the end of each meeting, subjects cannot signal their desire to
cooperate by requesting or offering a token. These same considerations apply
to Memory with the difference that there is no lower bound on balances and
that consumers are always passive.
The spontaneous use of tokens as money
In a meeting, consumer and producer make simultaneous selections from their
choices sets, without prior communication. Choices are observable at the end
of the meeting, to speed up learning in the game. Choices that are incom-
patible lead to the status quo. This design ensures that subjects can neither
incur involuntary losses, nor can garnish their opponent’s token holdings or
earnings. If subjects choose to conditionally trade help for a token, then this
would suggest that tokens have acquired value endogenously.
Second, to avoid biasing the results in favor of the emergence of mone-
tary exchange the design includes actions that are antithetical to monetary
exchange. By choosing Z for 0, the producer commits to execute Z only if
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the consumer chooses give 0. By choosing 1 for Y , the consumer commits to
transfer a token if the producer avoids the choice Z. Hence, tokens may take
on a negative connotation as subjects could use them to tag producers who
do not provide unconditional help. Given this richer action set, the addition
of tokens might increase coordination problems relative to Baseline.
The actions Z for 0 and 1 for Y are antithetical to monetary exchange.
The outcome function specifies that a producer executes Z only if the consumer
keeps her token, while the consumer keeps her token only if the producer un-
conditionally helps. These actions are consistent with money having a negative
connotation because they allow subjects to tag opponents as defectors. To see
this consider that there are two types of players in each period, A (who starts
the supergame as consumers with one token) and B (who starts as a producer
without a token). A-consumers can tag as defectors B-producers by giving
them a token if they do not help. Consequently, B-producers “help” only if
their opponent keeps her token. On the other hand, A-consumers are identi-
fied as cooperators only if they do have a token, hence would ask for a token
if they are producers without one; in that match, a B-consumer would gladly
get rid of her token. Within this richer choice set, subjects have more trouble
in discovering the potential use of tokens as money.
Possible and impossible trades
Token transfers could not take place in every circumstance off equilibrium.
Trade is possible when the consumer has at least 1 token. Otherwise, trade
is impossible, in which case consumer and producer have a restricted choice
set. In the experiment, a consumer with 0 tokens had no action to take (=do
nothing), and his producer opponent could only choose between Y and Z.
Subjects were informed whether trade was possible before making a choice
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Token holdings
Period Producer Consumer
t=1 0 1
t=2 1 0
t=3 0 1
t=4 1 0
... ... ...
Table B.1: Using tokens to tag defectors
in a way that minimized the chance that such information would indirectly
reveal identities. Each player observed whether his opponent had either 0 or
“1 or more tokens.” Providing information about token holdings reduces the
cognitive load for participants when making a decision and when interpreting
the outcome.
Monitoring of past actions
In all treatments subjects could observe on their screens the results of every
past period of the supergame. The information included the outcome of the
encounter, Y or Z, and whether the outcomes were identical in every pair of
the group. In Money, subjects also observed whether a token was transferred
in the encounter. This information was also visible at all times on the screen
and included all past periods. Each subject had also a pen and a sheet of paper
to fill in with the results. Requiring manual writing is a standard procedure
in experimental economics for the purpose of maintaining participants alert to
the ongoing session and to make sure that subjects are aware of the outcome
of interactions as the experiment unfolds. The same procedure was followed in
all treatments. If subjects wanted to rely on history-dependent strategies, such
as trigger strategies, they could easily access information about past outcomes
either on the screen or on paper. This design feature could have biased the
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results against the use of tokens as money.
2 Additional Tables and Figures
In the experiment, producers conditioned help on the opponent’s balance, L or
H (Table B.2). In Money and Memory treatments consumers with a balance
H receive more help than those with balance L. However, in Money producers
with a positive balance helped less frequently than producers with a balance
of 0 or less. On the other hand, in Memory this gap is less pronounced.
Consumers’ balance
Producers’ balance L H Total
Money
L 0.299 0.774 0.634
H 0.169 0.491 0.337
Total 0.258 0.726 0.569
Memory
L 0.477 0.592 0.567
H 0.486 0.683 0.605
Total 0.482 0.623 0.583
Notes: The percentages show the share of subjects in each category by treatment.
Table B.2: Frequency of cooperation by subjects’ balance (inexperienced ses-
sions).
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2.1 Experienced subjects
Dependent variable: Model 1 Model 2
Individual frequency (Baseline) (All treatments)
of cooperation Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Supergame -0.038*** 0.012 -0.038*** 0.011
Money 0.369*** 0.066
Money x Supergame 0.045*** 0.016
Memory 0.132* 0.068
Memory x Supergame 0.007 0.016
Constant 0.699*** 0.238 0.670*** 0.111
N. of obs. (N. of subjects) 120 (24) 360 (72)
R-squared within 0.098 0.064
R-squared between 0.115 0.728
R-squared overall 0.104 0.520
Notes: One observation per subject per supergame. All supergames included. Panel
regression with random effects at the individual level and robust standard errors (S.E.)
adjusted for clustering at the session level. The estimated coefficients for Money and Memory
are significantly different at the 1% level (p- value= 0.002). The estimated coefficients for
Money x supergame and Memory x supergame are significantly different at the 5% level (p-
value= 0.017). The sum of the coefficients Supergame and Memory x supergame is significant
at the 1% level (p-value = 0.005). The sum of the coefficients Supergame and Money
x supergame is not significant (p-value > 0.1). Controls include the following individual
characteristics: gender, major, two measures of understanding of the instructions (response
time and number of wrong answers in the quiz) and session location (Purdue, Chapman).
Table B.3: Cooperation frequency (experienced sessions).
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Dependent variable: Supergame 1 Supergame 5
Individual frequency
of cooperation Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Money 0.586*** 0.025 0.666*** 0.008
Memory 0.245** 0.055 0.210** 0.030
Constant 0.511 0.229 0.385*** 0.028
Controls Yes Yes
N. of obs. (N. of subjects) 72 (72) 72 (72)
R-squared 0.511 0.760
Table B.4: Treatment Effects on Cooperation in Supergames 1 & 5 (experi-
enced sessions).
Notes: One observation per subject. Experienced sessions. Robust standard errors (S.E.)
adjusted for clustering at the session level. In supergame 1 the estimated coefficients for
Money and Memory are significantly different at the 5% level (p-value: 0.042). In supergame
5 the estimated coefficients for Money and Memory are significantly different at the 1% level
(p-value: 0.005). Controls include the following individual characteristics: gender, major,
and two measures of understanding of the instructions (response time and number of wrong
answers in the quiz).
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Figure B.1: Cooperation frequency by treatment (experienced sessions)
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Figure B.2: Distribution of balances in Money and Memory (experienced
sessions)
Figure B.3: Trade emerges in Money but not in Memory.
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Figure B.4: Cooperation frequency and profits (experienced sessions)
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2.2 Treatment Money Unconstrained
Figure B.5: Cooperation frequency by treatment
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Dependent variable: Model 1 Model 2
Individual frequency (Baseline) (All treatments)
of cooperation Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Supergame -0.031** 0.016 -0.031** 0.013
Money -0.273*** 0.068
Money x Supergame 0.106*** 0.018
Memory -0.103* 0.062
Memory x Supergame 0.045*** 0.016
Unconstrained -0.183*** 0.057
Unconstrained x Supergame 0.030** 0.013
Constant 0.308** 0.127 0.423*** 0.093
Controls Yes Yes
N. of obs. (N. of subjects) 360 1440
R-squared within 0.064 0.109
R-squared between 0.259 0.188
R-squared overall 0.179 0.152
Table B.5: Cooperation frequency.
Notes: One observation per subject per supergame. Inexperienced sessions, all supergames.
Panel regression with random effects at the individual level and robust standard errors (S.E.)
adjusted for clustering at the session level. The estimated coefficients for Unconstrained and
Memory are significantly different at the 5% level (p- value= 0.014). The estimated coeffi-
cients for Unconstrained x Supergame and Memory x Supergame are significantly different at
the 10% level (p- value< 0.091). The sum of the coefficients Supergame and Unconstrained
x Supergame is not statistically significant (p-value > 0.1). Controls include the following
individual characteristics: gender, major, two measures of understanding of the instructions
(response time and number of wrong answers in the quiz) and session location (Purdue,
Chapman).
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Dependent variable: Money Unconstrained
Cooperation outcome in a pair Estimate S. E.
Supergame 0.141*** 0.041
Period -0.007*** 0.002
Balance
Producer, Consumer
L, H 0.057*** 0.016
H, L 0.001 0.012
H, H 0.220*** 0.068
Controls Yes
N. of obs. (N. of subjects) 2400 (48)
Table B.6: How balances in a meeting affect cooperation.
Notes: One observation per subject per period. Inexperienced sessions. Marginal effects
from a logit regression. Robust standard errors (S.E.) adjusted for clustering at the session
level. Controls include the following individual characteristics: gender, major, and two
measures of understanding of the instructions (response time and number of wrong answers
in the quiz).
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